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The euro area sovereign bond market crisis had its roots in investors’ concerns about the fiscal 
position of many of the area’s member states (Caceres et al., 2010).   The crisis highlighted the 
diverging fiscal positions of EU member states, both those in and not in the euro area, and the 
scope for sharp and rapid deteriorations in government deficit and debt positions to occur over 
a short timespan.   These developments called into question the efficacy of budgetary 
surveillance and practice at country and EU levels and arose even though the Stability and 
Growth Pact (adopted in 1997) has a “preventive arm” geared to ensuring detailed scrutiny of 
EU member states’ budgetary positions and the attainment of fiscal targets.   Central to the 
preventive arm is the submission by euro area member states and non-euro area member states 
of Stability Programmes and Convergence Programmes (henceforth, SCPs), respectively, for 
review by other member states and the European Commission.   SCPs outline governments’ 
economic outlook and fiscal policy over the medium term (specifically, a four-year-ahead 
horizon, including the current year).   These documents have been part of EU fiscal surveillance 
since the 1990s and, up until 2010, were subject to a comprehensive and standalone assessment 
by the Commission.  
The European Semester was adopted in 2010 with the purpose of providing better ex-ante 
economic and budgetary policies among member states through a more integrated framework 
for assessing public finance plans.   The Semester, which took effect in 2011, spans the first 
six months of the calendar year and had the effect of seeing SCPs being submitted to the 
Commission for review in April, rather than in the autumn.   The introduction of the Semester 
broadly coincided with a new “six-pack” (of five regulations and one directive) intended to 
strengthen the Pact by improving procedures aimed at reducing government deficits (including 
the imposition of sanctions for failing to eliminate an excessive deficit) and tackling 
macroeconomic imbalances.   Within the Semester, the assessment of the SCPs by the 
Commission was shortened and incorporated into the country reports of the member states.    
One aspect of prudent fiscal policy, both in general and within the EU, is controlling public 
expenditure dynamics.   Doing so can help avoid fiscal policy having a pro-cyclical influence 
on economic activity and can contribute to EU fiscal rules being respected.   Persistent spending 
overruns in the EU were a feature of the pre-crisis era and constituted a weak link in fiscal 
policy (European Commission, 2007).   As part of the “six pack” of reforms introduced in 2011, 
member states need to constrain government expenditure to help put it on a sustainable path, 
as well as adhere to already in-place operational rules concerning the structural budget balance. 





structural budget balance close to balance or in surplus, net expenditure should grow at a lower 
rate than medium-term potential output growth.   Moreover, particular spending restraint 
should be exercised when the economy is experiencing a cyclical upswing.  
Such action during the growth phase of the cycle would be in line with conventional policy 
advice that fiscal policy should be acyclical or counter-cyclical.   The former would involve 
government “sitting on its hands” during the economic cycle with the automatic stabilisers 
alone exercising a (counter-cyclical) influence on output, while an active counter-cyclical 
policy would complement the automatic stabilisers with government reducing discretionary 
expenditure during cyclical upturns and raising spending during downturns.   Should fiscal 
policy not be conducted in either an acyclical or counter-cyclical manner but in a pro-cyclical 
way, governments would be acting to exacerbate the economic cycle and to offset the effects 
of the automatic stabilisers on the economy.    
With the European Semester and the associated reforms of the EU fiscal rules in place since 
2011, an evaluation of the intended cyclicality of fiscal policy contained in member states’ 
annual SCPs since then and a comparison with ex-post data seem appropriate.   In this paper, 
the focus is on the expenditure side of national budgets alone and not on the cyclicality of 
member state budgets as a whole.   Government consumption and GDP data contained in the 
SCPs are used for such an assessment.   The results demonstrate that discretionary government 
expenditure policy is intended by EU member state governments to behave in a pro-cyclical 
manner, running counter to the spirit and intention of the EU fiscal rules and to claims that 
initiatives such as the Semester and “six pack” reforms would bring benefits to policymaking.    
Moreover, the paper shows that government consumption can also be adjudged to be pro-
cyclical ex-post, using data from the EU Commission’s AMECO database, but to a lesser extent 
than arises ex-ante.   The role of expectations in budget forecasting and planning is used to 
explain policy being more pro-cyclical ex-ante than ex-post and the results point to 
governments’ output growth expectations not being rational, with expectations shown to be 
extrapolative in nature.   Specifically, past movements in GDP appear to influence current GDP 
growth rate expectations.   In practice, it would appear that the recent growth performance 
experienced across EU member states has affected future growth expectations.   In that 
sense, notwithstanding the increased surveillance that has been taking place in recent years, the 
results here suggest that the assessment of fiscal policy within the EU is still subject to the 




been reported previously by Strauch et al. (2004), Jonung and Larch (2006) and, more recently, 
Beetsma et al. (2019).   The bias reported here is of undue pessimism, which does not threaten 
fiscal sustainability in contrast to the optimism bias documented in other studies.  
2. Literature Review 
Most empirical studies of the cyclicality of fiscal policy use ex-post data.   In a recent review 
of the literature in this area, Ihori and Itaya (2018) summarise a finding of pro-cyclicality 
arising in most developing countries in the literature on this subject, which their own empirical 
analysis supports and which they find also arises in some industrialised countries.   Those 
studies have been wide-ranging in the countries covered and in the methodologies used.   
Among the earliest analyses in this area, Gavin and Perotti (1997) find pro-cyclical policy 
occurring in Latin American economies.   Both Kaminsky et al. (2004) and Ilzetzki and Vegh 
(2008) detect pro-cyclicality arising in developing countries.   The former paper finds fiscal 
policy to be counter-cyclical in industrial countries.   Arreaza et al. (1999) observe pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy in OECD countries, while Lane (2003) finds both government investment and 
government consumption to be pro-cyclical for the same country grouping.   Talvi and Vegh 
(2005) find the cyclical components of real GDP and those of real government consumption to 
be positively correlated in OECD countries, with the exception of the G7 countries.   In a study 
of 14 EU member states, Balassonne et al. (2010) identify asymmetrical effects occurring 
during the economic cycle with both overall and primary budget balances deteriorating during 
downturns but not improving in the upturn phases.    
The literature also compares the stance of fiscal policy on an ex-ante and ex-post basis.   The 
ex-ante analysis indicates the fiscal stance intended by governments in their budgetary plans, 
assessed using their economic and fiscal projections, while the ex-post data show what actually 
transpired.   Forni and Momigliano (2005, p. 299) argue that an examination of the information 
available at that time budgetary decisions are made is important in assessing past policy as ex-
post data may “provide a misleading basis for such analysis.”   Bernoth et al. (2008) find pro-
cyclical fiscal policy being evident ex-post among a panel of OECD countries, with a more 
counter-cyclical stance planned ex-ante.   Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) observe planned 
fiscal policy as acyclical in EU member states and counter-cyclical in other OECD 
countries.   Cimadomo (2016) concludes that the balance of the international evidence indicates 




Another relevant issue in assessing the cyclicality of fiscal policy is the role played by official 
growth forecasts.   For a number of European countries, Jonung and Larch (2006) and Strauch 
et al. (2004) detect the presence of forecast bias in the budgetary process.   In particular, Jonung 
and Larch (2006) contend that many euro area countries over the period 1987-2003 exhibited 
an "optimism bias" where official growth forecasts, on average, over-estimate the underlying 
speed of growth of the economy.   In response to the distortionary effect of such forecasts on 
the budgetary process, they call for member states to use an independent forecasting authority 
to "foster the production of unbiased forecasts".   They find independent fiscal institutions to 
have no statistically significant bias in their forecasting.  
A methodological issue highlighted in the literature is that the endogeneity that arises between 
national output and its fiscal components can hamper the identification of the cyclical 
orientation of fiscal policy empirically.   The difficulty is that, say, an observed positive 
correlation between the growth rates of real GDP and real discretionary government 
expenditure does not necessarily mean that increased output growth leads government to raise 
its spending, rather it could be that higher government expenditure in itself causes output to 
increase.   The most basic econometric issue posed by the endogeneity between output and 
fiscal variables is that it results in ordinary least squares (OLS) parameter estimates that are 
biased downwards.    Studies such as Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) and Cronin and McQuinn (2018) 
use a variety of econometric techniques to address this endogeneity issue in assessing the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy.    
Against this background, this paper has two purposes.   First, it evaluates the intended 
cyclicality of fiscal policy in the EU in the current decade, a period when there has been a 
renewed emphasis on fiscal discipline in the post-financial crisis era.   It does so using an annual 
database of government consumption and output projections from the SCPs of EU member 
states from 2011 (when the European Semester took effect) to 2018.   The cyclicality of fiscal 
policy on an ex-post basis is assessed using EU AMECO data and is compared to the ex-ante 
results.   The second purpose is to examine the nature of official output growth forecasts as a 
possible explanation of the differences between the ex-ante and ex-post results and, in 
particular, to look for the presence of bias in such forecasts or otherwise.     





SCPs provide four-year ahead (including the current year) forecasts for many fiscal and output 
variables, with those projections taking account of the impact of budgetary policy on the 
economic outlook.   In using the SCPs to assess the cyclicality of fiscal policy, it is necessary 
to capture discretionary changes in fiscal policy alone, i.e. devoid of the direct effect of the 
economic cycle on the public finances.   The growth rate of real government consumption in 
the current year is suitable as such a policy variable.   It is available in tables found in SCPs 
that account for projected real GDP growth rates.   Since government consumption expenditure 
is fully at the discretion of government, there is no need for an adjustment to it in respect of the 
effect of cyclically-sensitive outlays, such as transfer payments’ effect on total government 
expenditure.1   Projections for real government investment growth are not included in SCPs 
(nor are growth rates of total government expenditure).   Not only are there a priori issues with 
using tax variables in the assessment of the cyclicality of fiscal policy (Ihori and Itaya, 2018) 
but data relating to suitable tax rates to use are not readily identifiable in SCPs.   Variables such 
as the government deficit ratio, as already noted, are endogenous to output, while cyclically-
adjusted budget balances raise well-documented issues of measuring output gaps, concerns 
which are particularly acute for small open economies (Cronin and McCoy, 1999).   
Consequently, the growth rate in real government consumption expenditure is the fiscal 
variable used here in assessing the cyclicality of fiscal policy, while the real GDP growth rate 
provides the measure of economic activity.    
SCPs are standardised in format and a table outlining “macroeconomic prospects” appears in 
each one.   This table contains the real GDP growth rate forecast for the current year (i.e. the 
year in which the particular SCP is being submitted), as well as its components, including the 
real final government consumption growth rate.   The forecasts for the current year for both 
variables were collected from the SCPs submitted by member states over the period 2011 to 
2018 (the period in which the European Semester has been in effect).   SCPs are available for 
all 28 EU member states over the eight years with the exceptions of Greece in all years, Portugal 
in 2011, Cyprus between 2013 and 2015, and Croatia which only starting submitting 
programmes in 2015.   Since one of the econometric methodologies (that of Pedroni) employed 
in section 4 requires balanced panels, those four countries are dropped from the sample and the 
panels then comprise data for the remaining 24 countries, implying that 192 observations of 
 
1 In 2018, government consumption constituted some 44 per cent of total government expenditure in the European 




the real government consumption growth rate and of the real GDP growth rate are used in the 
estimations. 
3.2  Methodological approach 
With this choice of regression variables, the basic econometric approach taken, as per Ilzetzki 
and Vegh (2008) and Cronin and McQuinn (2018), is to regress percentage changes in real 
government consumption (denoted 𝑔 below) on percentage changes in real GDP (denoted 𝑦 
below).   The beta coefficient (𝛽) in the regression estimation indicates the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy with a positive value indicating pro-cyclicality arising over time, a negative value that a 
counter-cyclical policy has been occurring, and an insignificant coefficient signalling an 
acyclical fiscal stance. 
All data included in SCPs are annual and the focus here is on the current year real government 
consumption and real GDP growth rate projections and the relationship between them.   Output 
and government outlay projections beyond the current year are not considered because they 
will be affected by future budgetary policy decisions and, consequently, an ex-ante versus ex-
post comparison would not be appropriate for them.   The data for the ex-post comparison are 
taken from the EU AMECO database.    
The basic ex-ante regression is then: 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 =  𝛽𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡        (a) 
Where  𝑔𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 is the in-year forecast for the growth rate of real government consumption in year 
𝑡, the year in which the particular SCP for country 𝑖 is published, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 is the in-year forecast 
growth rate of real GDP in the SCP, and 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is an error term.   
The basic ex-post regression is: 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡       (b) 
Where  𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is the ex-post growth rate in real government consumption in year 𝑡 for country 𝑖, 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is its ex-post growth rate in real GDP, and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is an error term.   
Equations (a) and (b) are estimated here using a standard fixed effects approach, with dummies 




present the difficulty that that the covariance between the output growth rate and the error term 
may not be zero due to endogeneity between GDP and government consumption.   To control 
for this potential endogeneity, the approach of Cronin and McQuinn (2018) is adopted to a 
panel setting.   This includes estimating equations (a) and (b) using a standard fixed-effects 
model, with the fully-modified panel data approach of Pedroni (1999) and Pedroni (2004) 
acting as a cross-check on those estimates.   The Pedroni model used here involves the Phillips-
Hansen FM-OLS approach to estimating relationships between variables with country-specific 
time series data.     
4. Econometric Results 
4.1  Ex-ante and ex-post results 
The results where the standard fixed effects approach is applied to the estimation of equations 
(a) and (b) are those reported in the tables below.   The beta coefficients estimates from the 
application of the Pedroni method are of similar values to those of the standard fixed effects 
approach and are reported in footnotes (the full Pedroni estimates and related statistics are 
available on request from the authors).   
Table 1 then reports the results when the ex-ante data from the SCPs are used.   The highly 
significant beta coefficient value of 0.61 indicates intended fiscal policy to be pro-cyclical in 
nature.2   The measure of fit (centred R-square value) is 0.44, while the results for the country-
specific dummy results are also provided in the table.   A standard F-test indicates that the fixed 
effects specification is warranted over an OLS one. 
In Table 2, which reports the results where the ex-post data are used, the beta coefficient 
estimate, while statistically significant, is much lower, at 0.23, than the estimate in Table 1.3 4   
The null hypothesis that the coefficient on the 𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 variable (of 0.61) in the fixed effects model 
of Table 1 is the same as that on the 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 variable (of 0.23) in Table 2 is rejected with the chi-
squared (with one degree of freedom) statistic having a value of 13.27 and a significance level 
of 0.0003.   The results then suggest that fiscal policy in the EU is pro-cyclical, irrespective of 
 
2 The beta coefficient using the Pedroni approach is 0.56 and statistically significant. 
3 In this case, the Pedroni-based estimate of the beta coefficient is 0.31 and statistically significant. 
4 The ex-post real GDP output growth rate for Ireland was extremely high in 2015, reflecting the effects of shifts 
in capital assets.   Excluding Ireland from the dataset does not have any noticeable impact on the results reported 




whether you examine the issue from an ex-post or an ex-ante perspective.   Policy, however, 
appears to be substantially more pro-cyclical ex-ante than ex-post.    
Both Marinheiro (2008) and Cronin and McQuinn (2018) use an additional regression equation 
in their investigations of ex-ante versus ex-post fiscal behaviour, of the following form: 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡       (c) 
The estimation of this equation with the dataset here gives the results shown in Table 3.   The 
regression of the ex-post real government consumption expenditure growth rate on ex-ante real 
GDP growth renders a beta coefficient of 0.55.   Z-tests indicate this to be statistically 
insignificantly different from the beta estimate of 0.61 in Table 1 and significantly different 
from the coefficient of 0.23 in Table 2.   As with Marinheiro (2008), this is interpreted as fiscal 
policy that was intended ex-ante to be pro-cyclical not reacting to unforeseen errors in the 
output forecasts made by the member states and thus rendering fiscal policy to be much less 
pro-cyclical ex-post than was initially intended.   Consequently, it is necessary to assess 
whether errors did occur in member states’ forecasting processes and what form they took.   
This is addressed in the next sub-section of the paper. 
Before moving to that section, it is worth considering whether the finding of a pro-cyclicality 
to fiscal policy in the EU during the sample period is sensitive to other influences on 
government expenditure plans.   Cimadomo (2012) controls for the influence of the political 
cycle by adding a dummy variable with a value of one in parliamentary election years and zero 
otherwise.   A similar procedure is employed here with 51 of the 192 observations being years 
when such general elections took place during the 2011 to 2018 sample period.5   A dummy 
variable, which has a value of one in an election year and zero in all other years, is used to 
capture this potential influence on government spending.   Another influence on government 
expenditure plans in the EU would be the expenditure benchmark, introduced as part of the 
2011 “six-pack” reforms.   This acts to constrain the government spending of member states 
that have not met their MTO.   When the benchmark applies, the net growth rate of government 
spending must be at or below a country’s medium-term potential output growth rate.   Its 
purpose is to help steer the member state towards meeting its MTO.   Of the 192 observations 
in the dataset used here, 125 relate to member states that had not attained their MTO in the 
previous year.   Consequently, as a test of whether having met the MTO or not had an effect 
 




on the cyclicality of planned and actual expenditure, a second dummy variable takes a value of 
one if the MTO had not been met in the previous year and zero otherwise.    
When these two dummy variables are added to the regression equations (a), (b) and (c) above, 
the coefficient on the election dummy variable is insignificant in all three cases, while that on 
the MTO dummy variable is significant and negative for the augmented estimation of equations 
(a) and (b).6   Accordingly, a member state not having met its MTO has a damping effect on 
government expenditure, as intended by the benchmark, given the real GDP growth rate.   The 
value and significance of the coefficient on the GDP variable in all three regressions is broadly 
unchanged.   This is a similar finding to Cimadimo (2012) on the effect of the electoral cycle.   
Consequently, the addition of these variables does not affect the assessment of the cyclicality 
of fiscal policy in the EU over 2011 to 2018.  
4.2   Issue of Governments forecast/output expectations 
The results in the previous sub-section indicate fiscal policy to be more pro-cyclical ex-ante 
than ex-post.   In seeking to explain this difference, the nature of official forecasts (i.e. those of 
member state governments) of future economic activity needs to be considered, in particular to 
examine whether a bias is evident in those forecasts.   This issue has been highlighted 
previously in the literature.   Strauch et al. (2004) provide an analysis of the forecasting in the 
earliest SCPs (those between 1991 and 2002).   Bias in budgetary projections are found to be 
owing in part to where member states are in the economic cycle, with member states not using 
the information available to them efficiently.   Focusing on the forecasting performance of the 
governments of the four largest EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, and the UK), 
Jonung and Larch (2006) find an optimism bias in official forecasts of output growth.   They 
argue that this bias could be addressed by having independent national authorities prepare 
member states’ official forecasts.   
Figures 1 presents the average forecast errors – calculated as the actual outturn less the forecast 
– for GDP growth rates across the 24 different countries for the 2011-2018 period.   On average, 
official forecasters were unduly pessimistic in their output growth expectations.   Most of the 
countries (17 of them) have a positive error, indicating that the official forecasts were on 
average less than the actual outcome, while only seven countries had negative errors.   For the 
 
6 To save space, these results are not reported in tabular form here but are available from the authors on request.   
The values of the coefficient on the significant MTO dummy variable in the augmented regressions (a) and (b) 




sample as a whole, the average forecast error was 0.39 per cent, while, when Ireland is 
excluded, the average is 0.22 per cent.7 
To test for bias in the forecasts, three separate tests are used here.   First, according to Keane 
and Runkle (1990) and Bonham and Cohen (2001), two conditions must hold in order for 
expectations in forecasting to be deemed rational.   When 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is regressed on 𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡, the 
coefficient on the regressor must be insignificantly different from one and the country dummies 
must be insignificantly different from zero.   The results of such a regression of 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 
and country fixed effects are shown in Table 4.    From that table, it is clear that the second 
condition is violated as the standard F-test test of whether the dummies are different from zero 
indicate it to be strongly rejected.    
A second test of rationality is to follow the recent approach of Croushore and Van Norden 
(2018) and test whether the forecast error (the difference between 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡) is statistically 
different from zero.   The null hypothesis that the forecast error is insignificant is rejected at 
the one per cent level with a p-value of 0.007.8    
Finally, whether official forecasters follow some form of adaptive expectations/extrapolation 
approach in making projections is considered.   In other words, does recent economic activity 
(recorded as ex-post data) have an effect on the official GDP forecast?   In Table 5, the 
coefficient and diagnostic results of the regression of the ex-ante GDP growth rate, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡, on 
the most up-to-date observation of the first-lag of the actual GDP growth rate, denoted as 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
(as taken from the EU AMECO database) are presented.   It is apparent that past realisations 
of GDP appear to have a significant impact on future expectations of GDP, i.e. official 
forecasters follow an adaptive expectations-based forecasting/generating process rather than a 
rational expectations approach.   The positive coefficient on the lagged observation of 
economic activity suggests that forecasters believe that if output contracts then this will be 
followed by a further decline, or if output expands then a further increase will ensue.   If the 
coefficient on lagged output growth had been equal to zero then past changes in output would 
have no influence on future forecasts, which would be in line with the rational expectations 
hypothesis.  
 
7 If Malta, which had the next highest average forecast error, is also excluded then the average error would still 
be 0.12 per cent. 





Prior to the financial crisis of 2008 and the euro area sovereign bond crisis that emerged soon 
after, fiscal policy in EU member states was not conducted in a satisfactory manner.   The 
European Commission (2011, p. 70) notes “persistently lax fiscal policy” prevailing for the ten 
years after the introduction of the euro in 1999, while Beetsma et al. (2009) find implemented 
budgetary adjustment routinely falling short of that planned.   The results presented here point 
to fiscal policy in the EU remaining pro-cyclical in the current decade, even though there was 
a tightening of surveillance procedures and preventive measures after the crisis, including the 
initiation of the European Semester in 2011.   The econometric estimations show government 
consumption to be pro-cyclical ex-ante based on the data included in the SCPs submitted by 
member states as part of the Semester.   Such a policy stance is unwelcome as it indicates 
intended budgetary policy acting to aggravate the output growth cycle when it having no effect 
or a counter-cyclical effect would be preferable.    
A comparison between the cyclicality of fiscal policy ex-ante and ex-post since 2011 is also 
made.   Tests suggest that government consumption on an ex-post basis could have been more 
pro-cyclical but for official Government forecasts of real GDP growth being unduly 
pessimistic.   This bias arises because official forecasters were influenced by past realisations 
of actual GDP growth, i.e. the relatively poor performance of European economic activity post-
2011.   Governments thus were too pessimistic in forecasting real GDP growth, yet their 
intention was still to exercise fiscal policy in a pro-cyclical manner. 
From a policy perspective, it is disappointing that after all the changes to surveillance and 
preventive procedures after the financial crisis, the supervision and analysis of fiscal policy is 
still adversely affected by a bias in official growth forecasts.   Based on their assessment of an 
optimism bias in official forecasts, Jonung and Larch (2006) argued for the adoption of fiscal 
councils in the preparation of government budgetary and economic forecasts, including those 
in SCPs, to address bias.   Such councils have become commonplace in the meantime among 
EU member states.  The findings presented here based on data for recent years indicate that the 
optimism bias identified in previous studies of official forecasts in the EU no longer arises, but 
has been replaced by undue pessimism in forecasting.   This may reflect governments adopting 
a cautious approach to macroeconomic forecasting during the euro area sovereign debt crisis 
and the years that immediately followed.   While such a form of bias may be less troublesome 




example, might require a tightening of budgetary policy to meet particular targets), it 
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Table 1. The Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy Ex-ante - Fixed Effects Model 
 Dependent Variable: 𝑔𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Signif. 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 0.61 0.08 7.21 0.00 
Belgium -0.05 0.50 -0.09 0.93 
Germany 0.81 0.51 1.59 0.11 
Estonia -0.54 0.54 -1.01 0.32 
Ireland -1.94 0.55 -3.52 0.00 
Spain -2.30 0.50 -4.56 0.00 
France 0.07 0.50 0.13 0.89 
Italy -0.61 0.49 -1.23 0.22 
Luxembourg -0.16 0.55 -0.29 0.77 
Malta -1.36 0.56 -2.42 0.02 
The Netherlands -0.07 0.50 -0.14 0.89 
Austria -0.33 0.51 -0.65 0.51 
Slovenia -1.62 0.51 -3.19 0.00 
Slovakia -1.96 0.54 -3.61 0.00 
Finland -0.21 0.50 -0.42 0.68 
Latvia -0.21 0.56 -0.38 0.71 
Lithuania -0.51 0.56 -0.91 0.36 
Bulgaria 0.44 0.53 0.83 0.41 
Czech Republic -1.04 0.52 -2.00 0.05 
Denmark 0.06 0.51 0.11 0.91 
Hungary -1.44 0.54 -2.68 0.01 
Poland 0.30 0.56 0.54 0.59 
Romania 0.05 0.56 0.08 0.93 
Sweden 0.05 0.54 0.09 0.93 
United Kingdom -0.28 0.51 -0.54 0.59 
     
F(24,167)=      3.01463 (with significance level of 0.00) 






Table 2. The Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy Ex-post - Fixed Effects Model 
 Dependent Variable: 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Signif. 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 0.23 0.07 3.54 0.00 
Belgium 0.36 0.69 0.52 0.60 
Germany 1.40 0.69 2.02 0.04 
Estonia 1.00 0.73 1.37 0.17 
Ireland -0.22 0.84 -0.26 0.79 
Spain -0.32 0.69 -0.46 0.64 
France 1.00 0.69 1.45 0.15 
Italy -0.60 0.68 -0.88 0.38 
Luxembourg 2.11 0.70 3.00 0.00 
Malta 3.05 0.77 3.95 0.00 
The Netherlands 0.08 0.69 0.11 0.91 
Austria 0.50 0.69 0.72 0.47 
Slovenia -0.16 0.69 -0.23 0.82 
Slovakia 1.12 0.71 1.58 0.12 
Finland 0.35 0.69 0.51 0.61 
Latvia 1.76 0.72 2.43 0.02 
Lithuania -0.55 0.72 -0.76 0.45 
Bulgaria 0.95 0.70 1.36 0.18 
Czech Republic 0.34 0.70 0.48 0.63 
Denmark 0.23 0.69 0.33 0.74 
Hungary 1.04 0.70 1.47 0.14 
Poland 1.19 0.72 1.65 0.10 
Romania 0.38 0.73 0.53 0.60 
Sweden 0.95 0.70 1.36 0.17 
United Kingdom 0.29 0.69 0.42 0.68 
     
F(24,167)=      1.77 (with significance level of 0.00) 





Table 3. The Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy Ex-post Government Consumption growth rate 
Regressed on Ex-ante GDP growth rate - Fixed Effects Model 
 Dependent Variable: 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Signif. 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 0.55 0.11 4.81 0.00 
Belgium 0.01 0.68 0.02 0.99 
Germany 1.02 0.68 1.49 0.14 
Estonia 0.45 0.73 0.61 0.54 
Ireland -0.11 0.74 -0.14 0.89 
Spain -0.80 0.68 -1.17 0.24 
France 0.62 0.68 0.92 0.36 
Italy -0.84 0.66 -1.26 0.21 
Luxembourg 1.08 0.75 1.45 0.15 
Malta 2.58 0.76 3.41 0.00 
The Netherlands -0.28 0.68 -0.41 0.68 
Austria -0.02 0.69 -0.03 0.97 
Slovenia -0.58 0.69 -0.85 0.40 
Slovakia 0.32 0.73 0.44 0.66 
Finland -0.14 0.68 -0.20 0.84 
Latvia 0.84 0.76 1.11 0.27 
Lithuania -1.46 0.76 -1.93 0.06 
Bulgaria 0.24 0.71 0.34 0.74 
Czech Republic -0.16 0.70 -0.23 0.82 
Denmark -0.23 0.68 -0.33 0.74 
Hungary 0.26 0.72 0.36 0.72 
Poland 0.23 0.76 0.30 0.76 
Romania -0.50 0.76 -0.66 0.51 
Sweden 0.06 0.72 0.08 0.94 
United Kingdom -0.21 0.69 -0.30 0.77 
     
F(24,167)=      1.33613 (with significance level of 0.148) 






Table 4. Test of Forecast Rationality - Fixed Effects Model 
 Dependent Variable: 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Signif. 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 0.97 0.11 8.53 0.00 
Belgium 0.11 0.68 0.16 0.87 
Germany 0.39 0.69 0.57 0.57 
Estonia 1.25 0.73 1.71 0.09 
Ireland 4.52 0.75 6.06 0.00 
Spain -0.26 0.68 -0.39 0.70 
France 0.08 0.68 0.11 0.91 
Italy -0.36 0.67 -0.54 0.59 
Luxembourg -0.29 0.75 -0.39 0.70 
Malta 2.34 0.76 3.09 0.00 
The Netherlands 0.22 0.68 0.32 0.75 
Austria 0.00 0.69 0.00 1.00 
Slovenia 0.30 0.69 0.44 0.66 
Slovakia 0.27 0.73 0.37 0.71 
Finland -0.27 0.68 -0.40 0.69 
Latvia 0.45 0.76 0.59 0.56 
Lithuania 0.48 0.76 0.64 0.52 
Bulgaria 0.13 0.71 0.18 0.86 
Czech Republic 0.45 0.70 0.64 0.52 
Denmark 0.01 0.68 0.02 0.99 
Hungary 0.12 0.72 0.17 0.86 
Poland 0.33 0.76 0.44 0.66 
Romania 0.65 0.76 0.86 0.39 
Sweden -0.29 0.73 -0.39 0.70 
United Kingdom 0.24 0.69 0.34 0.73 
     
F(24,167)=      2.18 (with significance level of 0.00) 





Table 5. Test of Biases in Government Expectations Formation - Fixed Effects Model 
 Dependent Variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Signif 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.29 0.04 7.67 0.00 
Belgium 0.70 0.41 1.70 0.09 
Germany 0.84 0.41 2.03 0.04 
Estonia 1.33 0.43 3.08 0.00 
Ireland 1.15 0.49 2.34 0.02 
Spain 1.09 0.41 2.66 0.01 
France 0.76 0.41 1.87 0.06 
Italy 0.41 0.41 1.01 0.32 
Luxembourg 2.24 0.42 5.36 0.00 
Malta 1.74 0.46 3.81 0.00 
The Netherlands 0.84 0.41 2.06 0.04 
Austria 1.10 0.41 2.68 0.01 
Slovenia 1.09 0.41 2.64 0.01 
Slovakia 1.81 0.42 4.31 0.00 
Finland 0.77 0.41 1.90 0.06 
Latvia 2.18 0.43 5.10 0.00 
Lithuania 1.78 0.43 4.15 0.00 
Bulgaria 1.49 0.42 3.59 0.00 
Czech Republic 1.26 0.41 3.03 0.00 
Denmark 0.96 0.41 2.34 0.02 
Hungary 1.77 0.42 4.25 0.00 
Poland 2.18 0.43 5.12 0.00 
Romania 2.39 0.43 5.53 0.00 
Sweden 1.66 0.42 4.00 0.00 
United Kingdom 1.15 0.41 2.79 0.01 
     
F(24,167)=      6.50 (with significance level of 0.00) 






Figure 1: Country-specific Average GDP Forecast Error (%), 2011 – 2018 
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